This analysis estimates a selection-adjusted model of the premium for nongroup insurance to measure the effect of health status on the cost of nongroup insurance. Using data from two recent national surveys, the probability of buying nongroup insurance is about 50% lower for people in fair or poor health compared to similar people in excellent health. Correcting for selection, premiums are about 15% higher for people with modest health problems, and 43% to 50% higher for people with major health problems compared to those in excellent health. We use the selection-corrected premiums to simulate the effects on the price and affordability of nongroup insurance for the uninsured under two recent tax credit proposals.
This analysis estimates a selection-adjusted model of the premium for nongroup insurance to measure the effect of health status on the cost of nongroup insurance. Using data from two recent national surveys, the probability of buying nongroup insurance is about 50% lower for people in fair or poor health compared to similar people in excellent health. Correcting for selection, premiums are about 15% higher for people with modest health problems, and 43% to 50% higher for people with major health problems compared to those in excellent health. We use the selection-corrected premiums to simulate the effects on the price and affordability of nongroup insurance for the uninsured under two recent tax credit proposals.
The number of uninsured people increased to 41.2 million in 2001 after declining slightly in the previous two years (U. S. Census Bureau 2002) . Many are concerned that recent sharp increases in medical costs (Strunk, Ginsburg, and Gabel 2002) and premiums for employer-sponsored insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation 2002) place growing pressure on employers, especially small employers, to drop health coverage as a fringe benefit (Toner and Stolberg 2002; Cutler 2002) . These worries about the future course of insurance coverage are compounded by the results of studies that documented very modest increases in insurance coverage during the economic boom of the 1990s (Strunk and Reschovsky 2002; Holahan and Pohl 2002) . If economic growth is sluggish over the next few years, then the number of uninsured could continue to increase.
Although nongroup, individually purchased insurance currently covers a relatively small proportion of the population, it has received increasing attention as a potential policy option for extending insurance coverage to people without access to employer-sponsored insurance (Cunningham 2002; Pauly and Nichols 2002; U. S. Senate 2001; McClellan 2002) . Proponents argue that nongroup insurance offers the opportunity to tailor coverage to individual preferences and to extend coverage to a substantial number of people at low cost (McClellan and Baicker 2002; Harrington and Miller 2002) . Opponents argue that the nongroup insurance market as currently structured offers little value for the dollar (Hall 2002; or little help for those with health problems, who arguably have the greatest need for health insurance (Pollitz and Sorian 2002; Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas 2001; Simantov, Schoen, and Bruegman 2001) .
Two critical questions in the debate over using tax credits for nongroup coverage to reduce uninsurance are: What are the premiums the uninsured might face in the nongroup insurance market? And how do nongroup insurance premiums vary with the health characteristics and age of the uninsured? The answers to these questions have a direct bearing on the value of possible credits to consumers and ultimately on the effectiveness of tax credits to reduce the number of uninsured Americans.
If people in fair or poor health are excluded substantially from the nongroup market, observations on the relationship between health status and nongroup premiums based on those who actually have nongroup policies may understate the true cost that uninsured people with health problems would face in the nongroup market. This paper examines the extent of potential ''selection bias'' by estimating a statistical model that explores whether nongroup insurance premiums vary with health under two assumptions. One is that there is no selection of people into nongroup coverage on the basis of health status. The other is that health significantly affects whether a person buys nongroup insurance, and failure to account for this selection effect biases estimates of the relationship between health and the cost of nongroup insurance. We estimate the models using data from the 1999 and 2001 household surveys of the Community Tracking Study, which includes information on the presence of several chronic conditions as well as self-reported health status.
Background Pauly and Nichols (2002) recently summarized several issues underscoring the policy debate about whether recently proposed tax credits are sufficiently large to make nongroup insurance affordable. They note that there is little agreement on the answer to this question, which depends critically on how much it costs to buy nongroup insurance. In particular, if people with health problems do face substantially higher nongroup premiums, then this raises the question of whether a tax credit that is not adjusted for health really can make nongroup insurance affordable for this potentially vulnerable population.
Critics of nongroup insurance claim that intense medical underwriting in the individual insurance market either prices people with preexisting health conditions out of the market, excludes coverage for their conditions from policies offered, or makes it difficult for them to get an offer at any price (Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas 2001; U.S. GAO 1996) . Proponents argue that analysis of actual experience with nongroup insurance suggests that there really is relatively little medical underwriting, and that the cost of insurance is not very sensitive to differences in people's health conditions (Herring and Pauly 2001) or that the decision to purchase coverage is not strongly related to health (Saver and Doescher 2000) .
So far, the evidence that has been brought to bear either has been based on hypothetical individuals, or based on research that has not adjusted for selection bias. For example, Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas (2001) asked insurance brokers in eight communities to quote premiums for seven hypothetical individuals or families, each of whom had some type of a health problem, ranging from relatively minor (allergies) to severe (AIDS). They found that the premiums quoted for each case varied substantially in each community, and that many of the quotes either excluded care for the particular health condition or carried substantial additional premiums to provide coverage. Other studies (Simantov, Schoen, and Bruegman 2001; Families USA 2001) relied primarily on information obtained from Internet sites that allow people to apply for individual health insurance. These studies have shown that premiums increase sharply with age. However, they have not been able to analyze variations due to health because the Internet sites do not typically quote premiums for people with health conditions. Critics contend that these studies are limited because they are based on hypothetical situations and do not reflect people's actual shopping behavior (Herring and Pauly 2001) . They argue that the variance in premiums is not as relevant as the fact that there are premium quotes at the lower end of the range, although this does not mean that everyone can find low-price policies. They also argue that if the nongroup insurance market were to grow because of the infusion of a large number of healthy people motivated by tax credits, the underlying risk pool would become much more favorable and the extent of medical underwriting would diminish. While this view also is based on hypothetical reasoning, they point to studies arguing that there is relatively little medical underwriting in the actual market for nongroup insurance and that the decision to purchase nongroup insurance does not seem to be influenced significantly by people's health status.
Three recent studies explored the relationship between health status and nongroup coverage or premiums without any adjustment for possible selection bias. However, each of these studies can be criticized for excluding people with public insurance and access to employer-sponsored insurance. If people with health problems selfselect into public programs (for instance, if they are unable to work) or into employer-sponsored group insurance-which generally costs less than comparable nongroup insurance-then excluding them from analyses of nongroup premiums may cause biased results. Saver and Doescher (2000) used data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey to explore factors related to the purchase of nongroup insurance. They estimated a multivariate logit model containing extensive demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic controls on a sample limited to those covered by nongroup insurance and the uninsured. They found that health measures were weak predictors of nongroup insurance purchase. Pauly and Nichols (2002) also looked at the relationship between health and the probability of nongroup coverage using data from the 2001 Community Tracking Study. They limited their sample to ''nongroup candidates,'' defined as people without access to employer-sponsored insurance and not covered by public insurance. They found that being in a household with someone in fair or poor health reduces the probability of nongroup coverage, and being in a household with someone with a chronic condition increases the probability of nongroup coverage. They found the interaction between fair/poor health and presence of chronic conditions to be insignificant. Herring and Pauly (2001) imputed expected health care expenditures (from a regression estimated from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey) to people with nongroup insurance who responded to the 1997 Community Tracking Study (CTS) Household Survey. They then re-gressed the nongroup premium on this predicted expense measure plus control variables. Although premiums increased with expected total health care expenses, the relationship was far smaller than proportional. They interpreted this finding to imply that there is relatively weak medical underwriting in the nongroup market. Alternatively, their result may reflect both the effects of regulations that limit medical underwriting in some states-a factor which was omitted from their analysis-and effects of the self-selection or exclusion of people in poor health from the nongroup market.
None of these studies explicitly adjusts for possible selection bias. If selection bias based on health does exist, then adjusting for its effect on nongroup premiums is essential for evaluating the effects of potential policies to subsidize the cost of nongroup insurance. In particular, if nongroup premiums for people in poor health are systematically understated by selection bias, then estimates of the adequacy of subsidies provided by tax credits will be overstated for people in poor health.
We explore the influence of selection bias by using data on essentially all nonelderly adults to estimate a first-stage selection equation that tests whether health status affects the probability of having nongroup coverage. We then estimate a structural nongroup insurance premium model, both with and without an explicit control for the effects of selection. This research extends our knowledge by exploring potential biases associated with selection into the nongroup insurance market.
Data
We used data from the 1999 and 2001 household surveys conducted as part of the Community Tracking Study. The CTS collects data primarily from randomly selected households in 60 communities (across 35 states) that are representative of the U.S. civilian population in the contiguous 48 states. Approximately 60,000 people were interviewed in each survey round. The response rates for these two rounds of the CTS were between 60% and 65%.
The sample for this analysis consists of all nonelderly adults who were not covered by either Medicare or military health insurance. Nonelderly people covered by Medicare either have end-stage renal disease or a long-term disability, which effectively would exclude them from the nongroup insurance market. Similarly, people covered by military insurance were assumed to be outside the nongroup insurance market. We also excluded full-time students because they often are covered as dependents on their parents' family policies.
The initial sample included 69,793 adults between the ages of 18 and 64. About 5% of cases were deleted because of missing information, leaving a final sample of 66,260 nonelderly adults who were interviewed in either 1998-99 or 2000-01. There were 2,771 adults identified as policyholders (owners) of nongroup insurance. Nongroup premiums were self-reported and recorded for whatever time period (e.g., one month, three months, year) the respondent specified. (257, or 9.3% of respondents, did not report a premium.) Reported premiums were converted to a monthly basis, and extreme values (less than $10 or more than $2,000 per month) were recoded as missing for estimation, which left 2,339 nongroup policyholders with observed monthly premiums.
Information on states' regulation of nongroup insurance markets as of 1997 was obtained from detailed summaries collected by the Institute for Health Policy Solutions (1998) . (These regulations did not change significantly during the years covered by the CTS surveys.) Information on the presence of a high-risk pool and enrollment in high-risk pools relative to nongroup coverage by state in 1998 was from Achman and Chollet (2001) . Distance to the nearest safetynet provider, which is an independent variable in the first-stage selection equation, was constructed from data from another study that linked CTS data to information on the locations of community health centers and safety-net hospitals . The final source of data used in the analysis was the Area Resource File, which supplied information used to construct a measure of the cost of medical care by county.
Analytic Approach

Conceptual Framework
We treat the premium equation as a structural model of the supply of insurance. Specified in inverse forms, with price as the dependent variable and quantity as an endogenous independent vari-able, it reflects the price at which an insurer would be willing to sell a nongroup policy to an individual (or family) with particular characteristics.
The premium is hypothesized to depend on: X, the number and characteristics (age, health, gender, and smoking status) of people covered by the policy; C, the cost of medical care in the area; R, the regulatory structure of the nongroup insurance market in the state; and Q, an indirect measure of the policy's endogenous, but unobserved benefits, which represent the quantity of insurance purchased. However, a nongroup premium is observed only if a person owns a nongroup policy. Thus, the premium equation is estimated conditional on the person being a policyholder, which is represented by a reduced-form selection equation.
where, X, C, and R are exogenous variables from the supply equation (equation 1) and Z represents exogenous variables, described subsequently, from the demand for insurance. The dependent variable for the selection equation is a dichotomous indicator of whether the person is the policyholder (owner) of a nongroup insurance policy. Note that this is a more narrow definition than being covered by a nongroup policy, which would include dependents. Moreover, it does not distinguish new buyers from people who may have bought their policies many years earlier.
In specifying the selection equation as a reduced form, we assume that employment status and job characteristics are endogenous (Chernew and Hirth 2002) , and do not include any direct measures of whether a person (or person's spouse, if married) works or is self-employed or, if an employee, firm characteristics such as size or industry. The independent variables in the selection model include the exogenous variables from the premium equation as well as exogenous demand-side factors such as the person's education, race, ethnicity, income, and attitude towards risk.
Several demand-side variables not contained in the premium equation identify the selection equation. They are hypothesized to influence whether a person buys nongroup insurance, but do not influence the cost of that insurance for people who would be covered. These include: u whether a person has a spouse covered by Medicare, u whether a person is a risk taker, u race and ethnicity, u a measure of the generosity of the state's Medicaid/State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) eligibility rules for lowincome children, interacted with the presence of children and low income, and u the distance to the nearest safety-net provider.
Empirical Specification and Statistical Estimation
Variables in the premium equation. The dependent variable in the premium equation is the log of the reported monthly premium. Premiums are adjusted for secular inflation using the medical care component of the consumer price index. 1 (A dummy variable to distinguish 1999 from 2001 survey respondents also is included to control for the effects of unmeasured secular changes.) Since the premium is for the policy rather than for the individual, the independent variables in the premium equation include information on both the policyholder and the policyholder's spouse and children, if they are covered by the policy. Explanatory variables in the premium equation include gender, health, and age of the policyholder and the policyholder's spouse, if the spouse is covered by the policy. (Spouse variables are set to 0 if the person is not married or if the spouse is not covered by the policy.) The policyholder's health is measured by a set of dummy variables representing combinations of self-reported health status (excellent, very good or good, fair or poor) and the number of chronic conditions (none, one, and two or more). 2 A spouse's health is measured by an analogous but less detailed set of variables. 3 Another healthrelated variable is whether the policyholder currently smokes, which may be taken into account in medical underwriting.
After exploring alternative approaches to measuring age, the age of the potential policyholder is entered as a continuous variable, while the spouse's age is entered as a set of dummy variables. The model also includes dummy variables indicating whether a covered adult is a woman of childbearing age (18 to 45), whether any children are covered and, if so, the number of children covered by the policy, and whether the randomly selected sample child included in the survey is in fair or poor health. 4 The premium equation includes a measure of the cost of medical care in the area-Medicare spending per beneficiary (adjusted for medical care price inflation over time) by county to represent variations in the cost of medical care across and within the 60 communities surveyed by the CTS. Medicare spending data incorporate information from indices of the local costs of medical inputs to set payments to physicians and hospitals. 5 In addition, expenditures per beneficiary reflect variations across geographic areas in utilization due to factors such as greater provider availability and differences in providers' practice patterns.
Several measures of the extent of regulation of the nongroup health insurance market are included in the premium equation. Four dichotomous variables represent state individual insurance market regulations: whether the state requires guaranteed issue of all products; whether it requires guaranteed renewal of policies; whether it uses either community rating or rate bands that exclude health to determine allowable premiums; or whether it limits premium increases. The model also includes a dummy variable indicating whether the state had a high-risk insurance program in 1999 and a measure of its size-the ratio of people in the program to the number of people covered by nongroup insurance in the state (Achman and Chollet 2001) .
The nongroup policy's benefits (covered services, cost-sharing provisions, limits, and maximums, etc.), which represent the quantity of insurance provided by the policy, are not directly observed in our data. 6 However, since benefits are endogenous and would need to be replaced by some type of an instrumental variable in estimation, we assume that a reasonable exogenous proxy for the level of benefits is family income, which we measure by a set of dichotomous indicators of the level of family income relative to poverty. We hypothesize that the premium should increase with family income because higher-income families purchase policies with more generous benefits, both to provide greater protection against income loss from illness and because insurance is a normal good. 7 Variables in the selection model. The dependent variable in the selection equation is a dichotomous indicator of whether the person is a policyholder (i.e., the owner of a nongroup insurance policy). The sample for this equation is all adults between the ages of 18 and 64 (after exclusions noted earlier). Spouses' gender, age, and health characteristics are included, with values set to 0 for unmarried adults.
In addition to the exogenous variables from the premium model, the selection equation includes dichotomous measures of potential policyholders' race, ethnicity, and education. Family income, which also enters the selection equation, is measured as a single dummy variable for income below 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL). This is done to create interaction variables between family income and measures (described subsequently) of the availability of care from safety-net providers and of the eligibility generosity of the state's public insurance coverage of children, either through Medicaid or the SCHIP program.
These personal and family characteristics arguably could influence premiums indirectly if they were to affect consumer decisions regarding the level of benefits. Since premiums reflect both the degree of risk to the insurer and the quantity of benefits, these variables could influence the observed premium and might not be good candidates for identifying the selection equation. Accordingly, we include in the selection model several variables that arguably influence demand without significantly affecting the observed premium. Having a spouse covered by the Medicare program, whether because of age, end-stage renal disease (ESRD), or disability, should increase the demand for nongroup coverage since Medicare does not cover spouses who do not meet its eligibility requirements. Another indicator of the demand for nongroup insurance is whether a person is a risk taker (i.e., is much more likely than the average person to take risks). For example, people who think of themselves as being risk takers in an entrepreneurial sense may be more likely to be self-employed. As such, they would have less access to employer-sponsored insurance and the nongroup market may be their only option for health insurance coverage. 8 Two area-level variables that might influence whether a person has a nongroup policy are the likelihood of covering one's children through the Medicaid or SCHIP programs and the availability of free care from the health care safety net. Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is constructed as a state-level variable that indicates the proportion of low-income children in a fixed population (the entire CTS sample of low-income children) who meet the state's income and family structure criteria for eligibility (Cunningham, Hadley, and Reschovsky 2002) . This variable captures the relative generosity of states' policies rather than an individual's potential eligibility, which depends on the family's choices about work and income. This variable is interacted with whether a person has children and income below 200% FPL, since the eligibility rules should affect only lowincome families with children.
The likelihood of owning a nongroup policy also should be influenced by the availability of free care from the safety net. To capture this effect, we use a measure-which was derived from another study using CTS data-of the distance to the nearest safety-net provider (either a community health center or a safety-net hospital) based on respondents' and safety-net providers' 5-digit zip codes.
Statistical Estimation
The premium equation without the selection adjustment is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The selection-adjusted model uses the Heckman maximum likelihood procedure in STATA (Heckman 1979; StataCorp 1999) . 9 Both models account for the complex design of the CTS Household Survey. Since the state-level variables may be correlated with unmeasured state characteristics, we also estimate the models using a set of state dummy variables to control for unmeasured state effects. All analyses are weighted to be nationally representative.
Results
Differences in Health Status by Type of Insurance
The major premise underlying estimation of a selection-adjusted premium model is that people covered by nongroup insurance are systematically different from the uninsured and people with other insurance in terms of both observable and unobservable health characteristics. Table 1 shows the distributions and mean values of several observable health characteristics by type of insurance. The 4.8% of adults covered by nongroup insurance are in better health than people in the other insurance groups and also have better measures of family health. People covered by public insurance are in the poorest health. Given these substantial differences in observable health conditions, it seems reasonable to assume that the groups also differ in their unobservable health characteristics.
Who Buys Nongroup Insurance? Table 2 shows the mean values of the variables used in the Heckman selection equation, which is a probit model of the probability of buying a nongroup policy. Even though people covered by nongroup policies are in better health than the uninsured, they tend to be older than nonpolicyholders. Policyholders also are significantly more likely to be college graduates, to have family incomes greater than two times the poverty level, to be non-Hispanic whites, and to have a spouse covered by Medicare. There are also some differences in the regulatory environments of the states in which policyholders and nonpolicyholders live.
The estimates of the selection equation coefficients (Table 3) show that the probability of buying a nongroup policy decreases significant-ly with declining health status of the potential policyholder and, to a lesser extent, with increases in other family members' health risks. For example, the predicted probability that a person in fair or poor health will be a policyholder is half that of a similar person in excellent health with no chronic conditions (.023 compared to .046); for a person with a child in fair or poor health, the predicted probability is 30% lower (.025 compared to .036). 10 Smokers are less likely to be policyholders, while people who are risk takers are somewhat more likely to be policyholders. Increasing age, higher education, and higher family income increase the probability of being a policyholder. Racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to buy nongroup insurance.
The key identifying variables are statistically significant and have the expected effects. Having a spouse covered by Medicare or having a low family income and living far from a safety-net provider both increase the probability of being a policyholder. For a person with a Medicare spouse, the predicted probability increases from .036 to .046. If the distance to the nearest safetynet provider is 20 miles, then the predicted probability of being a policyholder increases to .068, compared to .03 for a similar person living only three miles from a safety-net provider. Lower-income people with children are less likely Hadley and Cunningham (2002) .
to be policyholders where Medicaid/SCHIP coverage is relatively more generous. Some state insurance regulations and the presence of a high-risk pool also affect the probability of being a policyholder. 11 Living in a state that has community rating or prohibits health rating lowers the probability of being a policyholder, which is consistent with some prior evidence suggesting that carriers are less likely to sell policies to high-risk people when rates are regulated (Chollet, Kirk, and Simon 2000; Buchmueller and DiNardo 1999; Sloan and Conover 1998) . However, if the state also regulates the amount that premiums can increase, the probability goes up. Finally, people are more likely to buy nongroup insurance if the state has a high-risk pool.
Rho, the measure of correlation between the errors in the premium and policyholder equations, is highly significant (x 2 ¼ 212.9), fairly large, and negative (ÿ.94). The negative sign suggests that people facing higher premiums are in fact less likely to buy nongroup insurance coverage. The high level of statistical significance further suggests that failure to account for this selection effect likely will result in biased premium predictions from the model without the selection adjustment. Table 4 compares the coefficients from the OLS and selection-adjusted premium equations. In the OLS version of the premium equation (without any selection correction), only one of the policyholder's health variables (excellent health, one or more chronic conditions) approaches statistical significance and some health variables have negative coefficients, suggesting that people in less than excellent health or with chronic conditions pay about the same premium as someone in excellent health with no chronic conditions. Similarly, none of the measures of spouses' or children's health is statistically significant.
Effects of Health on the Cost of Nongroup Insurance
Premiums are strongly related to the number of people covered and their ages in the equation without the selection correction, although the measures of the spouse's age indicate little variation between the ages of 18 and 54. Covering a spouse increases the premium by about 70% and covering children raises the premium by about 30%, although the number of children covered has a small and insignificant effect. Premi-ums increase with the cost of medical care in the area, measured by the average Medicare payment per beneficiary in the county. The state insurance regulation variables suggest that guaranteed renewal and community rating increase premiums, while constraining premium growth is associated with lower premiums. The proxy variables for generosity of the policy's benefits suggest a strong positive relationship between benefits and the premium, with low-income people having less generous benefits that lower the cost of a policy by 30% to 40% relative to a policy owned by a higher-income person with family income exceeding 600% of poverty. 12 In contrast, the health variables in the selection-adjusted premium model do suggest a significant relationship between health and premiums. Relative to someone in excellent health with no chronic conditions, a policyholder with ''minor'' health problems (excellent health, but has a chronic condition, or very good or good selfrated health and either no or one chronic condition) pays about 15% more for a policy. If the policyholder has ''major'' health problems (very good or good self-rated health with two or more chronic conditions, or fair or poor health regardless of chronic conditions), then the premium is estimated to be 43% to 50% higher. 13 Other health-related measures also increase premiums. Smokers pay about 16% more. Having a spouse in less than excellent health adds 10% to 14% to the premium (although the coefficient of the variable for a spouse in fair or poor health is not statistically significant, presumably because of the very small number of nongroup policyholders with a spouse in fair or poor health). Having a child in fair or poor health raises the premium by 35%, and covering a woman of childbearing age adds 19%.
Premiums also increase with the policyholder's age, though not as sharply as suggested by the OLS estimate. The age gradient appears to be steeper with regard to the spouse's age-if the spouse is between 18 and 44 the premium is 41% lower than if the covered spouse is between 55 and 64. The costs of covering a spouse and children are also somewhat higher in the selection-adjusted model. The effects of state regulation (community or no health rating, regulation of premium increases) and having a high-risk pool are larger in the selection-adjusted model than in the OLS model. (The state regulation ef- fects become small and insignificant if state dummies are included in the model.) Finally, proxy variables for the level of benefits are very similar in both models.
To illustrate the effects of health, age, and family structure on nongroup premiums, we use the selection-adjusted model to predict premiums for three specific family structures (single male, two adults with no children, and two adults with two children) at two age levels for the adults, 25 and 55. In one set of simulations, only the health of the policyholder varies, with all other variables set at their sample means (for all adults). In the other simulations, which illustrate a ''worstcase'' scenario, we also assume that the policyholder is a smoker, that the spouse has a chronic condition (but is not in fair or poor health), and that the family has a child in fair or poor health. As shown in Table 5 , the 25-year-old, healthy adults with no children face relatively modest premiums of about $1,200 per year per adult. 14 However, being 55 with health problems for the policyholder and family members causes premiums to increase sharply: a family of two adults who are 55, have major health problems, and have two children, one of whom is in fair or poor health, is estimated to face a premium just over $14,000 per year.
In contrast to these calculations, using the coefficients from the model not adjusted for selection bias results in substantially lower predicted premiums for older people and for people with health problems. The family estimated to face a selection-adjusted premium of $14,404 is predicted to have a premium 42% lower, $8,391, by the uncorrected model. In general, predicted premiums not adjusted for selection bias are about half as large for families where both the policyholder and a family member have major health problems, and about one-third lower if only the policyholder has a major health problem.
A Comparison of Two Recent Tax Credit Proposals
President George W. Bush's fiscal year 2004 budget included an individual insurance tax credit that would provide individuals not eligible for either public or employer-sponsored coverage and with incomes under $15,000 a $1,000 credit that would decrease to zero at an income of $30,000 (McClellan 2002) . Families with incomes up to $25,000 would receive $1,000 per adult and $500 per child, up to a maximum of $3,000. The size of the credit would decrease as family income increased to $60,000. Families with higher incomes would receive no credit.
The bipartisan Relief, Equity, Access and Coverage for Health (REACH) Act (S. 590), introduced by Sen. Jim Jeffords in 2001, included tax credits for people without access to public or employer-sponsored insurance of up to $1,000 for individuals with adjusted gross incomes below 15 The tax credit amount would decline as income increased. Individuals with incomes of $45,000 or more and families with incomes of $65,000 or more would not receive any credit. Although neither of these proposals has been enacted, they are indicative of a range of proposals that would have been submitted for legislative consideration.
To assess the potential impact of tax credits on the cost of nongroup insurance for uninsured people, we use data from the 1999 and 2001 CTS household surveys to identify uninsured people who are potentially eligible to receive a REACH credit based on their current insurance coverage. 16 We estimate that there are approxi-mately 26.7 million people without access to employer-sponsored or public insurance. As shown in Table 6 , nearly all of them, 93.8%, would be eligible to receive a credit under the REACH proposal. The Bush proposal, which eliminates the credit at lower income levels, would provide a subsidy for 78% of the uninsured. The average credit (across individuals and families) for those qualifying would be $1,622 under REACH and $1,184 under the Bush proposal.
In order to estimate the amount of subsidy (tax credit as a percentage of the premium) provided by a credit and the impact on affordability, we simulate nongroup premiums under two assumptions about the generosity of benefits, as approximated by the effects of the family income c Sets the minimum benefit to the premium paid by a family with an income between 200% and 299% of poverty; higher income families are assumed to have more generous policies and to pay higher premiums. d Tax credit as a percentage of the predicted premium. e Assumes that lower-income people buy policies with less generous benefits and lower premiums, as indicated by the income coefficients in Table 4. dummy variables in the selection-adjusted premium equation (Table 4 ). 17 In the first, we impose a minimum benefit package set to be no less generous than the level corresponding to a policy held by a lower-middle income family (income between 200% and 299% of poverty).
In the second simulation, low-income people are assumed to buy less generous policies, based on the relationship between family income and premiums reported in Table 4 . Even if the credit provides a substantial reduction in the premium, the post-credit premium still needs to be affordable to induce people to purchase coverage. While the relationship among income, price, subsidy percentage and the decision to purchase insurance is quite complex, a useful yardstick for measuring affordability is the premium as a percentage of family income. To gauge the impact of tax credits on affordability, we look at the distribution of people across four levels of affordability: premium less than 5% of family income, 5% to 10%, 10% to 15%, and more than 15% of family income.
Under both tax credit proposals, substantial numbers of people would receive credits covering 50% or more of the cost of individual insurance. Assuming a minimum benefit package, the Bush proposal provides large subsidies to 40% of the target population and the REACH proposal to 68%. Relaxing the minimum benefit assumption (by allowing the predicted premium to be lower for lower-income people, based on the coefficients of the income variables in Table  4 ) increases these proportions slightly to 46% for the Bush proposal and 72% for REACH.
The tax credits also improve the affordability of nongroup insurance. Without a tax credit, only about 11% of the eligible uninsured would face premiums costing less than 5% of income, and more than 40% would have to pay more than 15% of income. Depending on the assumption of a minimum benefit package, the proportion in the most affordable range increases substantially to 35% to 40% under the Bush credit and to 56% to 60% under REACH.
Who benefits the most and the least from a tax credit? Using the credits provided by the Bush proposal under the assumption that there would be no minimum benefit package, we compare the characteristics of people who would face a relatively more affordable post-credit premium relative to income-less than 5% of family income-to people who still would face a cost exceeding 15% of their income, even with a tax credit. Not surprisingly, those who benefit the most tend to be younger, healthier, and have higher incomes compared to those who still would find nongroup insurance largely unaffordable (Table 7) .
Discussion
Estimating the Effect of Health on the Cost of Nongroup Insurance
Our analysis suggests three primary conclusions about the effects of health status on nongroup insurance. First, deteriorating health significantly reduces the probability of owning a nongroup policy. Second, failure to take this relationship into account may lead to a substantial underestimate of the effects of both personal and family health problems on the cost of nongroup insurance. Third, after correcting for the effect of selection bias in estimating the premium cost of nongroup insurance, it appears that people in fair or poor health can expect to face premiums 43% to 50% higher than otherwise similar people in excellent health.
The first result contradicts the findings reported by Saver and Doescher (2000) , who found little relationship between health and being covered by a nongroup policy. One reason for the difference in findings may be that Saver and Doescher (2000) excluded people covered by public or group health insurance from their analysis. Thus, their result would be biased if being in less-than-perfect health induces people to seek public (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare coverage for the disabled) or group insurance coverage rather than forego coverage altogether. The differences in observable health characteristics by insurance status reported in Table 1 suggest this conclusion.
We also find that the probability of purchasing nongroup insurance has a significant negative correlation with the cost of nongroup insurance, suggesting that people who are more likely to purchase a nongroup policy face lower premiums than people with a low probability of purchasing nongroup coverage. When this correlation is taken into account in estimating a model of the cost of nongroup insurance, conditional on a person owning a policy, declining self-reported health status suggests a generally increasing and relatively large quantitative impact on the premium for a nongroup policy: a person in less than excel-lent health with multiple chronic conditions or in fair or poor health is estimated to pay 43% to 50% more than a person in excellent health with no chronic conditions. In contrast, when the premium model is estimated without controlling for selection, all of the model's health variables are statistically insignificant, and predicted premiums are much lower for people and families with health problems. Herring and Pauly (2001) found that premiums increased much less than proportionately with increasing expected medical expense, and concluded from this that there is relatively little medical underwriting in the nongroup insurance market. Our results suggest that medical underwriting may be more extensive, and, in fact, may shut some people in less-than-perfect health out of the nongroup insurance market (Swartz and Garnick 2000; Chollet and Kirk 1998; Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas 2001) .
Several factors may affect the magnitude or precision of the estimated health effects. First, the health measures we used are fairly crude, and we had no direct information on services or health conditions that might be excluded by a nongroup policy owned by someone with health problems. More generally, we lacked detailed information on policy benefits, especially cost-sharing provisions. We attempted to approximate the level of benefits by a set of dummy variables for ranges of family income relative to poverty. Although the estimates of the health variables' coefficients were not sensitive to whether the family income variables were included in the model, future work should seek a better measure of the endogenous level of benefits.
Finally, we were unable to control for how long a person owned a policy. A long-term policyholder who experiences declining health may face a lower premium in the current period than would a similar person seeking to purchase a new nongroup policy, particularly in states that regulate nongroup insurance premiums. Thus, our estimates may understate the cost of nongroup insurance for potential new buyers with health problems.
Implications for Tax Credit Policies
We used the selection-adjusted premiums to simulate the effects of two recent tax credit proposals on the price and affordability of nongroup insurance for uninsured people without access to employer-sponsored insurance. The simulations suggest that a tax credit proposal along the lines of either the Bush or REACH plans would make individual insurance more affordable for a substantial number of Americans. Depending on the particular proposal and the assumption about a minimum benefit package, between nine and 15 million uninsured Americans would face a postcredit premium for nongroup insurance costing less than 5% of their family income. It is important to note, however, that the people helped the most are likely to be young, in good to excellent health, and with incomes above the poverty line. Moreover, our analysis does not address the issue of demand or take-up, which is an important topic for future research. Many of the uninsured already face ''affordable'' premiums, but do not purchase insurance. While encouraging coverage among the young and healthy is important, policymakers need to address some of the gaps in current proposals. How might a tax credit program be modified to provide greater benefit for those who stand to gain little benefit? What complementary policies might be considered?
This study suggests that structuring a tax credit to vary with the ages of the recipients, as well as with income and family size, would help, since health tends to decline with age and insurance premiums are known to vary with age. Affordability for the very poor could be improved by basing the size of the credit on income relative to the poverty line and providing larger credits for those below poverty than under the current proposals. 18 Adjusting tax credits for variations in health is a much more complex and challenging task. Roughly 36% of uninsured adults-about nine million people-who would qualify for a credit have major health problems as we define them. Many of these people might not be able to buy an individual insurance policy at any price, so an alternative approach that complements a tax credit is needed.
One option is to build on the experiences of state high-risk pools, using a decentralized network of administrative offices to screen applicants' health conditions (Conwell and Trude 2001) . The tax credit amount might be increased for people who qualify for high-risk pools, since premiums charged by high-risk pools can be extremely high (Achman and Chollet 2001) . If variations across states in the availability and structure of high-risk pools are viewed as inequitable, then a national high-risk pool or a joint federal-state approach could be evaluated. 19 Policymakers also might consider restructuring the individual insurance market (Swartz 2001a ). Concerns about potential adverse effects on market structure of regulatory requirements like guaranteed issue, guaranteed renewal, and medical-underwriting restrictions might be alleviated if tax credits expanded the size of the individual insurance market by attracting large numbers of relatively healthy people.
Another option to explore is re-insurance of individual policies or after-the-fact compensation of insurers for people who turn out to have very large medical expenses. The cost of insurance for these people would be spread over a potentially much larger pool or be publicly funded, depending on the specific mechanism used. For example, New York's Healthy New York program includes a re-insurance mechanism (Swartz 2001b (Swartz , 2002 .
Finally, many people with very low incomes also may be eligible for existing public insurance programs-suggesting that more could be done to enroll them. For others, such as adults without children or people in states with very low income-eligibility thresholds for covering otherwise eligible adults, expanding public insurance eligibility or allowing credits to be used to buy into existing public insurance programs might be considered.
1 Site-specific deflators were used for the sites that correspond to metropolitan areas that have their own CPI-deflators on the CPI website (www. bls.gov/cpi.home); for other sites we used published deflators based on census region and community size. Although it has been suggested that the medical care component of the CPI may not be the best index for deflating medical care prices over time (Newhouse 2001) , we believe that it is superior to the general CPI for deflating health insurance premiums, which probably track changes in medical care costs more closely than general inflation. 2 The survey asked people whether they had ever been told by a physician that they had any of the following conditions: asthma, arthritis, diabetes, uterine bleeding, benign prostate disease, skin cancer, any other cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, heart disease, or depression. 3 The combination of health status and number of chronic conditions used to describe the health of the policyholder's spouse resulted in several cells with very few observations, since there were only 873 covered spouses in the data. 4 One limitation of the survey data is that if a family has more than one child, health information is collected only for one ''sample'' child. We assume that if the sample child is covered by the nongroup policy, then all of the children are covered by the same policy. 5 The hospital wage index used in setting hospital payments is calculated at the county level. The geographic definition of other input price indices, such as for physicians' services, varies across states and can range from individual counties, to metropolitan areas, to larger groupings of counties, or even to an entire state. 6 Limited indirect benefit information on a sample of policies is collected through an insurer followback survey. However, the information is collected for product lines rather than specific individual policies. See Reschovsky and Hadley (2002) for information from the insurer followback survey. 7 We tested the sensitivity of the health variables' coefficients to this assumption by estimating the model both with and without the income variables in the premium model. The health variables' coefficients were robust. 8 Note that we do not include type of employment (self-employed, employee, unemployed) since choosing an employment type is probably endogenous with the insurance choice decision. 9 STATA does not incorporate all features of the CTS Household Survey design in its variance estimates. However, comparisons of equations using STATA and SUDAAN, which accommodates all components of the CTS design but lacks a Heckman selection routine, indicate that any biases from using STATA are trivial. 10 These and other predicted probabilities from the selection equation hold all other factors constant at their observed values for each case. 11 When the model was estimated with dummy variables to control for state effects, the state regulation variables became insignificant, although the high-risk pool variable remained significant. The effects of the health and other personal characteristics in the model were essentially unchanged. 12 Estimating the model without the benefit proxy variables has no appreciable effect on any of the other coefficients. 13 The great majority of people in fair or poor health report one or more chronic conditions. 14 The predicted premiums represent averages across groups that vary in health status but have all other characteristics the same. 15 REACH also includes provisions for tax credits to subsidize premiums paid by low-income people covered by employer-sponsored insurance in order to discourage people from dropping unsubsidized employer insurance in favor of subsidized individual insurance. However, this analysis only considers tax credits for individual insurance. 16 We defined the eligible population as individuals, families, or parts of families who: a) do not have access to employer-sponsored coverage, and b) are not covered by public insurance. We also excluded children in families with incomes less than 200% of poverty, since nearly all of them would be eligible for coverage under SCHIP. 17 The simulations assume that the individually purchased policy would cover all of the people in the family who would be eligible for a credit. 18 Tax credit policies may have trouble reaching the very poor if they are less likely to file income tax forms. 19 The Trade Act of 2002 provided federal grants to states without high-risk pools to develop programs.
